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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL M. HABBESHAW,
Respondent,
Case No.
vs.
10356
~ETA CAHOL HABBESHAW,
)
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondent, Russell M. Habbeshaw, filed a
Complaint for diYorce in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, Utah, on the 18th day of September,
1963. SerYice of Summons and Complaint was obtained
on the Appellant and the Return of Service filed with
the Court on the 19th day of September, 1963. No
answer nor appearance whatsoever was filed by the
1

Appellant, and a default divorce was granted th Re
spondent on January 3, 1964.
e ·
A Motion to Vacate the Judgment was filed hr th
Appellant and by Stipulation of parties tlie Decree· 11:e
Divorce was set aside. The Appellant was allowed ;
1
file an Answer and Counter-Claim. The matter wa~
heard without jury before the Honorable Stewart )I.
Hanson, Judge, on the 12th day of May, 1964, anda
Decree of Divorce was granted. The Appellant filed
a Motion For a New Trial on the 27th day of July.
1964 and an amended J\Iotion For New Trial on the
26th day of February, 1965, and both Motions were
denied, from which Order the Appellant appeals.
The appeal of the Appellant is taken from !hf
property settlement and alimony provisions of the Decree of Divorce, on the theory that the Appellant dia
not know the true value nor the extent of the proper!)'
acquired by the parties during their marriage whicn
constituted newly discovered evidence which could not
with reasonable diligence have been discovered ana
produced at the time of the trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
. for twenty-eig
. ht (28. 11
The parties were married
years ( R-63) . Four children were born, three of ~tn
are married, the fourth is 21 years old but .res1 ::
with Appellant (R. 64). During the m~rri~ge It
3
.
parties acqmred
numerous ren t aI properties ID

5

2

Lake City (See Exhibit P-1) and Respondent operated
the business known as Auerbach's Tearoom. (R-70).
The properties were given a value of approximately $:308,000.00 with equity interests of approximately $17:3,000.00. See Exhibit P and Respondent's
testimony ( R 64-69, 77, 78, 86, 88, 110-112). The
Appellant showed a very intimate knowledge of all of
the parties' property interests (R-143-145, 152, 159161). The evaluation placed on the properties by Respondent were not at any time during the trial challenged by the Appellant. The Court divided the rea]
property giving each party approximately one-half
of the equity interests of the properties (R-39). Ap·
pellant was further awarded $6,600.00 per year ali·
mony, a Cadillac, furniture and furnishings, benefits
of $150,000.00 insurance and $2,500.00 attorney fees.
Defendant was awarded personal belongings, his business, a car and truck, stock in a boat camp and a boat.
Defendant was ordered to assume the debts and obligations. ( R-38-40).
Appellant filed a l\1otion for New Trial, which
was denied, from which this appeal was taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS OF APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING DE-

3

•
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NE'V T
PURSUANT TO RULE 59(4) U.R.C.P. RIAL

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DI~.
CRETION IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY AND FIXING ALIMONY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTINGDE·
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
PURSUANT TO RULE 59(4) U.R.C.P.
Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P. lists the grounds for a ne~
trial as follows: Sub-Section ( 4). "Newly discovered
evidence, material for the party making the applica·
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence,lum
discovered and produced at the time of the trial." (Em·
phasis added) .
The Appellant argues that the Trial Court abusd
its discretion in not granting the Amended Motion!~
a New Trial for the purpose of presenting newly ifu·
4

C(ffered evidence. The so-called new evidence presented
a: the time of hearing the .Motion was neither new evi. .
deuce nor was it evidence that could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at the
time of the trial. The evidence offered in support of
the Motion was Defendant's Exhibit 8, a list and de,;cnptiou of each of the properties owned by the parties
and au appraisal covering same. The same evidence
,, a.•; presented to the Court as plaintiff's (Respondent's)
Exhibit I, accompanied by detailed evidence about
each property (R-64-69, 77, 78, 86-88 and 110-112).
,"lt the hearing of the Motion, Appellant applied a differeni formula for computing the value of the individual
properties, which was the only deviation from Respondent's evidence at the trial.
Each of the properties which were the subject to
distribution of the parties by the Court are properties
which were owned by the parties for a long period of
time. ( R 119-120).
The testimony of counsel for Appellant shows
consultations prior to the time the action was filed by
Respondent, ( R-104), at which time property settlements were discussed. Appellant's attorney testified
that he obtained a Restraining Order to prevent sale
of properties by the Respondent (R-105) and obtained
Respondent's tax returns and financial statements
(R-106) both of which show the property interests,
rental schedules, depreciation schedules, profit and loss
statement of rental properties of the parties set out
5

therein (Exhibits P-2 and P-3) and (R-73-74) C
f or A ppellant also testified that "My best · t'ounse].
es unaie
that I have had telephone conversations with M L '
•
.r r. und
and various other attorneys dealing with property whicn
l\ilr. Habbeshaw wanted to sell I would sav ha
'
.perp~
50 or 60 telephone calls. My estimate as far as hours
I have spent on this would be somewhere between ij
75 and 100 hours of consultation and research***·
(R-167). On cross-examination of Respondent i:R·
86-87, 110-112) each of the properties were identified
and a reasonable rental for each unit was established.
The rentals testified to by Respondent were not cha].
lenged by Appellant at the time of trial.
By stipulation of counsel, after conference ~it~
the Court, it was agreed that Respondent's counsel
would submit a Brief setting out all of the facts and
figures concerning the real property acquired by thf
parties during their marriage. ( R. 168) . Respondent
had ten days to file the Brief, and the Appellant had
ten days to answer the Brief. (R-169). Pursuant there·
to, Respondent filed a Brief with the Court, with a
copy to Appellant, setting out the value of each prop·
erty, the purchase price, the equity, the amount of tbe
mortgage, the holder of the mortgage, the monthly
payment, income of property and delinquencies, if any.
The information was available to Appellant and the
answering Brief of the Appellant did not challenge
. the era!·
any evaluations of properties. The propert ies,
.
uations as set out in Respondent's Exhibit lat the tune
. f orma ti.on se t out in Respond·
of trial was the same m

6

ent's Brief, the Appellant's Answering Brief and testified to by the Respondent on direct examination. (R64-69).

The Appellant's intimate knowledge of each of
the properties of the parties, as shown by her evidence,
belies statements of Appellant that her present knowledge of the property constitutes newly discovered evidence. During the testimony of the Appellant she discussed each piece of property, which showed a full awareness and knowledge of these holdings. (R-143-145,
152, 159, 160, 161).
The Appellant testified that "there are certain
pieces of property I prefer over others, that is for sure."
(R-143), and referring to a particular property at
416-422 East 5th South, Appellant stated, " * * * has
in my estimation great potential * * * " (R-143) and
about 509 East 8th South, the Appellant testified, "It
is an old house made into three units, it has a building
lot there too, * * * ." (R-144). Again, referring to
567 East 9th South and 866 South 6th East, the Appellant testified, "Yes, these should join into one piece
of property. " (R-144 and 145). It is submitted that
such knowedge of the properties by the Appellant
and her counsel, at the time of trial, precludes the Appellant from raising the issue for a new trial using the
theory of newly discovered evidence.
On January 14, 1964, the Appellant filed a Motion
to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree. (R-15-20). On page 3 of said Motion,
7

( R-17) Appellant lists all of the properties • 1'dent'fI YI"e
.
each .by address. The properties listed in the Appe11an,,
· '. e
Motion ~ R-17) .a~d those listed in Plaintiff's (Re:
spondent s) Exl11b1t 1, are the same properties whi·
were distributed to the parties in the Decree of n·norct
. .i.
after hearing by the District Court.
1

The lVIotion to Yacate by Appellant was daterl
January 14, 1964, and the trial was heard by the Cour.
on the 14th day of May, 1964, four months later. !t
is submitted that the detailed information co11cernuig
the properties as set forth in the Motion to Yacatn
the same information proposed January 26, 1965, mort
than one year later, as an Amended Motion for a ~ew
Trial, and as such does not meet with the requiremenb
as a basis for a new trial as set forth in Rule 59 (a) Ui·
U.R.C.P.

This Court has been uniform in its holdings that
the granting of a Motion for a New Trial is within t~
wide discretionary powers of the Trial Court. Set
Glazier vs. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 Pac. 188; Uptow1
Appliance & Radio Company, Inc., vs. Flint, 122 llfal
298, 249 Pac. 2nd 826; Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Ctal
122, 246 Pac. 2nd 264; Greco vs. Gentile, 88 Utah 2jj
53 P .2nd 1155; and Moulton vs. Staats, et al, 83 lTtali
197 27 Pac. 2nd. 455. It is submitted that there wasm
abuse of discretion by the Trial Court, the ruling ha1'lni
. 1un
. t he w1'd e d"iscre t'ionarvJ powers of th
been clearly wit
Court.

·

· 't holdin~

The Court further has been umform m 1 s

8

'

that to entitle a party to a new trial on ground of newly
discovered evidence it is necessary to show that the petitioning party used due diligence to produce the evidence
when the ease came up for trial. See Hydraulic Cement
Block Company vs. Christensen, 38 Utah 525, 114 Pac .
.524; Yan Dyke vs. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606,
161 Pac. 50; Shields vs. Eckman, 67 Utah 474, 248
Pac. 122; and State vs. Moore, 41 Utah 247, 126 Pac.
:3:22. The evidence presented by Appellant at the hearing of the Motion for a New Trial failed to show that
it was newly discovered or that Appellant had used
due diligence to produce the evidence at the time of
trial.
Finally, the evidence concerning the properties and
full disclosure by the Respondent and Appellant of
their values was summed up by the Appellant in her
admission of knowledge of the properties on direct examination as follows:
"Q. (.McCullough) : Now Mrs. Habbeshaw,
you have heard your husband's testimony with
respect to the property which has been accumulated during your married life, have you not?

A. Yes.
Q. And is there anything that has been omitted
or failed to be mentioned with respect to your
property?
A. I think it has been pretty well covered."
(R-116-117).

9

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DI~.
CRETION IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY AND FIXING ALIMONY.
The appellant argues that the Trial Court erredni
awarding properties to Respondent that far exceed~
that awarded to Appellant and that such an award wa,
an abuse of discretion. To determine whether the Cour:
abused its discretion, the evidence upon which the awm
was based should be examined. The evidence of \ht
value of the properties (R-64-69, 77, 78, 86-88 an~
110-112) was as follows:
PROPERTY A\VARD

Respcmdent

Appellant

Gross Value $187,50U
Mortgages
99,492.~
Equity
ss,oorn
:Monthly
2,595.00
Payments

Gross Value $121,000.00
Mortgages
35,913.68
Equity
85,096.32
Monthly
681.00
Payments

It should be noted that none of the value placed on
. by Respond en t (R -64 -69) were chal·
the properties
lenged at the time of the trial. The award of the Courl
pro~
g ave the parties almost equal equity values.'thThe
a proxi·
erties of Respondent were encumbered WI P be.
.
t f
rtgages encUJJl r
mately three times the amoun o mo
. . tilt
.
f
A
11
t
In
addition,
ing the properties o
ppe an ·

10

monthly payments of Respondent were approximately
four times those required of Appellant.
In addition, Appellant was awarded a 1956 Cadillac. household furniture, the benefit of $150,000.00 life
msura11ee (R-39) and the sum of $6,600.00 per year
alimony payable at $550.00 per month (R-38). Further,
the Appellant was awarded $2,500.00 for attorney
fees (R-39), and Respondent to pay the family debts
and obligations.

The award of alimony, in addition to the property
interests, was granted in the amount of $6,600.00 per
year, although Appellant testified to her monthly expenses of only $413.00 per month (R-129-131), but
asked that she be awarded $7,500.00 per year. (R-147).
The Court, in determining the amount of alimony, considered the evidence of Appellant's employment as a
licensed real estate salesman (R-150), the Respondent's liabilities of approximately $80,000.00 (R-108,
136-139) and Respondent's ability to pay (R-101),
plus Appellant's rental income of $430.00 per month.
(R-110-112).

In the cases of Woolley vs. Woolley, 113 Utah

321, 195 P2d 743; Bullen vs. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262

P 292; and Allen vs. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 Pac. 2d
872, this Court adopts the majority rule that an equitable formula for computing the wife's award would be
on a basis of one-third of the husband's property or income. In the case at hand, the award to the Appellant

11

~'as in excess of one-third of Respondent's property

mcome.

01

The Court in the cases of Pinion vs. Pinion, 92
Utah 255, 67 P2d 65, and :MacDonald vs. MacDonald,
120 Utah 573, 236 P2d 1066, set forth factors to ht
considered by a Trial Court in determining the award
of properties. Application of the facts of the present
case to the determining factors set forth by these cam
demonstrate that the Court did not abuse its discretion
but actually exceeded the awards usually granted in
such cases.

1

Appellant advances the theory that the properties
had a greater value than presented at the trial and :
proposes Exhibit Defendant 8, an appraisal of prop·
erties, to advance the theory. The basis of the increase
of values is that the properties are all prime apartme111 '
1
locations. Appellant argues that the evaluation of two
of the properties were understated by $80,000.00.
The Conclusion is not warranted nor is the evalu·
ation of proper statement. The Court could not specu·
late on the future development of any of the propertie~.
To adopt the argument of Appellant would require •
speculation by the Court which would include demo· '
lition of the present structures, financing and construct·
ing new apartments for profitable rentals.
As set out in the case of Bullen vs. Bullen anrl
Allen vs. Allen, supra, Sorensen vs. Sorenson, 14 Uta.h
2nd 24, 376 Pac. 2nd 547; Tsoufakis vs. Tsoufakis.
14 Utah 2nd. 273, 382 Pac. 2nd 412, and Wilson 11·

12

Wilson, 5 Utah 2nd. 79, 296 Pac. 2nd 977, this Court
has uniformly adopted the rule that unless there has
been a clear abuse of discretion the reviewing Court
will not change the decision of the trial court. (Emphasis added).
The Appellant wholly failed to present any new
eridence which could not have been discovered before
the trial. Further, the Appellant wholly failed to show
due diligence was used to discover the so-called new
evidence. Failure of the Appellant to make the proper
showing cannot now be claimed to be an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that under the evidence
presented in this case, the Trial Court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion for a New
Trial, nor did the Court err in distributing the property
and fixing the amount of alimony for Appellant.

Respectfully submitted,
FRANCIS C. LUND
Attorney for Respondent
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